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Theory, History, and
Methodological Positivism
in the Anderson–Thompson
Debate
Abe Walker

In the normally restrained world of academic discourse, the
Anderson–Thompson debate stands out as a break with the dominant culture of selfabnegation and humility. Over the course of three years (1964–1966), noted Marxist
historians Perry Thompson and Edward Thompson launched a series of spirited
attacks on each other that reach a level of virulence rarely approached in scholarly
publication.1 Yet the sheer violence of this debate masks the fact that something
important was at stake, with implications for historians of both the Marxist and nonMarxist variety, as well as for historically-oriented sociologists.
With the recent resurgence of interest in comparative–historical sociology,
both Anderson and Thompson have been written out of the canon, for reasons that
are somewhat unclear. For one, neither held a conventional academic position, but
neither did Barrington Moore, who is widely regarded as one of the preeminent
comparative–historical sociologists. Both are unabashedly Marxist, but comparative–
historical sociology has long had many adherents who locate themselves within the
Marxian tradition, even if they are not identifiably “Marxist.” Neither was trained as
a sociologist, but comparative–historical sociologists generally eschew disciplinary
distinctions, embracing history and political science as well as sociology. I will argue
in this paper that the issues raised by Anderson and Thompson deserve to be
repositioned at the center of the comparative–historical project. In the process, I
will position Anderson and Thompson against four other luminaries of comparative
historical sociology: Charles Tilly, Immanuel Wallerstein, Theda Skocpol, and
Craig Calhoun, all of whom have weighed in on the debate (Tilly and Wallerstein
lean towards Thompson, while Skocpol and Calhoun are more sympathetic to
Anderson). I will argue that the Anderson–Thompson debate cuts to the core of
existing disputes within comparative–historical sociology. Anderson and Thompson
deserve to assume their proper place not at the margins but at the center of the
comparative–historical project.  Finally, I will demonstrate that while the substantive
disagreements between Anderson and Thompson are important, their debate was –
in the last instance – an argument about methodology.
Edward Thompson was not, strictly speaking, a comparative
historian.  Thompson’s best known and most-cited work, The Making of the English
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Working Class, is not a comparative study at all. Instead, it is a lengthy exposition
of working class development in a single nation, spanning a seven-hundred-year
period.   Thompson’s writing style usually approximates what a historian might
term “thick description”—a painstakingly detailed narrative which attempts to
recreate and give life to working-class movements and cultures that had been
neglected by mainstream historians.  When it was first published, MEWC was a truly
groundbreaking work for several reasons.  First, it pioneered the detailed study of
groups long neglected by mainstream historians—the poor, the peasants, and the
incipient working class. Along with fellow working-class historians George Rude and
Fernand Braudel, Thompson was a pioneer within the field today known as social
history. Second, since poor people leave rarely leave behind an official record, it
relied on non-traditional “texts”—songs, poems, stories, and journalistic accounts—
to a much greater extent than had been done previously.  Third, and most important
for the purpose of this essay, it came as a direct challenge to the dominant trend at
the time in British history: to heap praise upon Continental working class movements
(especially the French), while largely dismissing the British working class.  It was this
third innovation that later drew the ire of one Perry Anderson.
The Debate
Three fundamental theses sustain MEWC. The first is co-determination,
or the notion that the working class “made itself as much as it was made.” Here,
Thompson is clearly challenging the myth of a meek, submissive English working
class. He observes that although British working-class movements never coalesced
into a party, and although their revolutionary efforts were abortive at best, British
history is checkered with working-class riots, revolts, uprisings, and rebellions.
The apparent timidity of working-class movements is as much a consequences
of extraneous historical conditions as endogenous inadequacies. Indeed, much
of MEWC is devoted to chronicling the forgotten history of British working-class
movements, as if to defend them in the tribunal of history.
Thompson’s second thesis, consciousness, is the idea that “class happens
where some men, as a result of common experiences, feel and articulate the
identity of their interests as between themselves, and as against other men”
(Thompson 1964: 9–10). In this sense, class is not a static object of study, but
an event that happens under particular circumstances. By implication, workers who
suffer from false consciousness or fail to understand their class position do not truly
comprise a class.3 In the process, Thompson introduces two key variables that tend
to be missing from traditional accounts of class formation: ideology and culture.
Thompson’s fundamental intellectual project in MEWC is to uphold the creative
activity and autonomy of English radicalism against those who would describe it as
a passive object of industrialization.
Lastly, Thompson, in asserting that the English working class was essentially
completed by the early 1830s, puts forward the idea of closure. After the 1830s, the
English working class is properly described as no longer “in the making” but “made.”
However, the class was unmade in the period between the 1850s and the 1870s.
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Anderson would take issue which each of these theses in turn, although the bulk
of his argument concerns a critique of the third and final thesis (closure), which is a
historiographical matter, not a theoretical concern.
The 20-mile channel separating Britain from continental Europe may as
well be an ocean: Britain lags behind the rest of Western Europe on nearly every
social measure, has a comparatively weak labor movement, and, of particular
interest to Perry Anderson, has no viable anti-capitalist political parties.3  Anderson’s
“Origins” reads as an extended lamentation on the current state of British politics.
The titular “present crisis” refers to the Conservative Party’s 13-year winning streak
in national politics, which would draw to a close with the election of a Labour
government only months after Anderson’s article was published. Nevertheless, by
the early 1960s, the Labour Party, wracked by internal crisis, was a shell of its former
self and no longer an “authentic” working-class formation (if it ever had been). To
be sure, Gaullist France was no workers’ paradise either, but the Socialist (SFIO)
and Communist (PCF) Parties remained viable oppositional forces throughout the
1960s, and both were far to the left of Britain’s Labour. More to the point, the French
labor movement in the 1960s was the envy of union militants worldwide, while
British unions were relatively quiescent. In Anderson’s admiration for the militancy
and (relative) successes of the French working class, his Francophilia is palpable.
Anderson embodies the stereotypical self-hating Brit.4
In a review essay on Anderson, Theda Skopol and Mary Fulbrook write:
“France represents the central line of evolutionary advance. From antiquity onward,
the histories of the French core approximate most clearly the Marxist concepts of key
modes of production and their progressive succession” (Skocpol 1984: 199).  But a
problem emerges when Anderson conflates his “model” (orthodox Marxist workingclass formation) with the closest actually-existing approximation (France).  Clearly,
France deviates in important ways from Marx’s preordained historical model.  But
in much of Anderson’s writing, France functions practically as a stand-in for Marxist
teleology.  In this view, Britain is deficient because it fails to follow the preordained
“script.”
Anderson conceives of French history as the shining example of revolutionary
purity in three respects: (1) the French bourgeoisie at the time of the Revolution
was fully developed and provided an appropriate target for proletarian rage; (2)
the social democratic state that emerged after the Jacobins was an ideal model for
an early proletarian movement; and (3) contemporary French communism is the
proper embodiment of a mature proletarian movement. Even before the advent of
capitalism, Northern France always conformed more closely to the archetypal feudal
system than any other region of the continent. In this sense, French history achieves
“holistic integrity, functional systematicity, and continuity” (Skocpol 1984: 32). In
contrast, Britain proves itself inadequate in each of these respects. The English
civil war occurred far too early, the political system that emerged in its wake was
attenuated, and contemporary British Marxism was (and is) isolated and marginal.
Anderson has a number of other serious complaints about Thompson.  While
he does not dispute the essential facts of Thompson’s exhaustive account, he
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is dismissive of movements that result in failure, whatever their potential. Put
simply, Anderson is far more interested in outcomes than in process. Most
fundamentally, Anderson disputes Thompson’s concept of class, which he considers
insufficiently economic. Anderson writes: “The thrust of [Thompson’s] argument
is still to detach class from its objective anchorage in determinate relations of
production, and identify it with subjective consciousness or culture ... It is better to
say, with Marx, that social classes may not become conscious of themselves, may fail
to act or behave in common, but they still remain, materially, historically—classes”
(Anderson 1980: 43). Instead, Anderson argues for a “concept of class as an objective
relation to the means of production, independent of will or attitude” (Anderson
1980: 38).  Here, Anderson quotes G. W. Cohen who argues that “a person’s class is
established by nothing but his objective place in the network of ownership relations
… His consciousness, culture and politics do not enter the definition of his class
position” (Cohen 1978: 73).   (As usual, Anderson is probably overstating his case in
this passage for the sake of polemic.)  Finally, Anderson criticizes Thompson’s notion
that class struggle might exist without class per se. For Anderson, Thompson’s
definition of class is far too “voluntarist and subjectivist,” for “classes have frequently
existed whose members did not identify their antagonistic interests in any process
of common struggle” (Anderson 1980: 40). Put differently, Anderson posits that
classes exist objectively—even when people fail to behave in class ways.
Anderson’s “Origins” is essentially a two-case comparison between the
“British model” and the “French model.” Although Anderson frequently refers to the
“continental” pattern, it is clear that “continental” is merely a proxy for “French,”
since Germany and Italy are themselves merely inferior approximations of the
French pattern. Moreover, Anderson positions the French model at the center of his
analysis. Even though he spills more ink discussing the British pattern, this is mainly
for the purpose of illuminating its inadequacies as against the French example of
revolutionary perfection. In this sense, the French pattern is ideal-typical (in the
normative sense of the term); it is the model against which all other possibilities
must be evaluated. Anderson’s model of British exceptionalism clearly refers not
only to difference, but to British inferiority. Scholars like Aristide Zolberg (2009) who
study exceptionalism debate whether exceptionalism implies distinction or merely
difference. In this case, there can be no question that Britain’s “exceptionalism” refers
to its inferiority.  
Thompson’s rebuttal to “Origins” comes in Poverty. In general, Thompson
does not dispute the facts of Anderson’s account, although he takes issue with some
of Anderson’s historiographical assumptions—especially his periodization.5 But
Thompson’s main line of (counter-)attack is methodological. He claims that crossnational comparisons are only meaningful insofar as pre-existing conditions are
themselves comparable. In other words, the French model cannot be meaningfully
applied to foreign turf. Given Britain’s unique class structure, agrarian population,
geographical isolation, and a host of other factors, all of which pre-date
industrialization, Britain could not have been reasonably expected to follow the
French pattern.  His observations here approximate Aristide Zolberg’s (2009) view
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of difference.  As Ira Katznelson and Zolberg have written, there is a tendency within
history to set up a single “model” of working-class formation against which all actual
historical experiences are judged as “exceptional” or “deviant.”  The remainder of
Poverty consists of a commentary on the misappropriation of Althusser by Anderson
(of which more later).
Finally, Anderson gets in the last word with Socialism.  On the first pages
of Socialism, Thompson is charged with “paranoia and bad faith,” “virulent travesty
and abuse,” “reckless falsification” (Anderson 1966: 1, 2). The brunt of Anderson’s
critique is concerned with what he considers a mischaracterization of his ideas by
Thompson.  He writes, “far from evincing the class reductionism of which Thompson
accuses us, we—once again—explicitly and categorically rejected it” (Anderson
1966: 10; emphasis in original). But Anderson then proceeds to take aim at
Thompson’s understanding of class, which he considers too malleable. Anderson
may not be a proper class reductionist in the pejorative sense, but he clearly has in
mind a more essentialist, objective view of class than does Thompson (as evidenced
by his reliance on the “analytic Marxism” of Cohen).  Anderson’s attempt to dismiss
Thompson by pointing to their commonalities therefore appears misguided.
Anderson scores more points with his attack on Thompson’s crude
populism, writing, “concrete analysis of class or social groups … is relinquished for a
perpetual, sententious invocation of ‘the people’—that is, exactly the terminology of
populism”; and continuing: “where ‘the people’ rather than concrete, determinate
social groups are continually invoked as the victims of injustice and the agents of
social change, it becomes natural to speak of the role of this people as a nation with
a pre-eminent destiny among other peoples” (Anderson 1966: 34).   But more to
the point, “the people” is a vague grouping that functions much more readily as a
rhetorical device than as an operationalizable category.  Anderson’s stylistic criticism
of Thompson is a veneer for his more important methodological criticism.
Commentary
If the Anderson thesis is reductionist, it is far less so than some of his
contemporaries—for example James Hinton, who criticized Anderson “for assertion
of primacy to the political and ideological factors”—practically the opposite of
Thompson’s critique. Anderson is somewhere in the middle of the spectrum of
class formation literature, distant from both the economic determinist and the
interpretivist extremes. Even an extreme interpretivist like Aronowitz cautions
against overemphasizing the cultural component of collective action.  Speaking of the
social historians who followed Thompson (though he might as well be commenting
on Thompson himself), Aronowitz writes, “their own historiographic interventions
emphasized the importance of cultural formation in the historical process perhaps
more strongly than they actually meant, in opposition to the determinism of the
economic historians, even the Marxists among them” (Aronowitz 1993: 96).  
Therefore, Thompson’s critique rings somewhat hollow. On this and other issues,
Anderson and Thompson have much more in common that they deign to admit.
Other commentators have noted that the differences between Anderson
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and Thompson are likely overblown.  As Susan Magarey notes, “Edward Thompson
repudiated the label ‘culturalism’ when it was applied to his work; Perry Anderson
has never laid claim to the label ‘structuralist’” (1987: 630).  Yet Thompson has come
to embody the culturalist tradition within British Marxism, while Anderson’s polemic
in Arguments emerged as the most visible representative of structuralism.  It should
be noted, however, that Thompson’s rejection of the “culturalist” label was in part
a reaction against Raymond Williams, who had proudly accepted the “culturalist”
label and from whom Thompson hoped to distance himself.
To fully understand Thompson’s relationship to culturalism, a closer reading
of his major theses is necessary.  The most oft-quoted passage in MEWC is one of
several definitions of class that Thompson offers in his introduction.   Taken out
of context, it seems to validate the structure/agency dichotomy that has become
popular in recent years:
Class is not a category but a process.   Classes arise because men and
women, in determinate productive relations, identify their antagonistic
interests, and come to struggle, to think, and to value in class ways; thus
the process of class formation is a process of self-making, although under
conditions which are “given.” (Thompson 1964: 107)  
This excerpt merits some analysis since it is so central to Thompson’s argument.  While
the relations of production are determinate (as in, having been definitely settled),
they are not determinative (as in, having the power to define the future).   The
men and women involved in the struggle must develop an understanding of
class antagonism, but more important they must act in “class ways.”   Therefore,
class happens as a result of emergence of class-based activity.   Thompson deftly
combines the objective component (productive relations) and the subjective
component (class consciousness and class action) of class formation, while clearly
placing more stock in the latter.  In a move that foreshadows Deleuze, Thompson
refers to class as a “process” or a “becoming,” once again emphasizing its dynamic
nature.
               In History and Class Consciousness, Georg Lukács famously distinguished
between class-in-itself and class-for-itself.   The former refers to the “objective”
identity of the working class, as determined by productive relations.   The latter
connotes the emergence of a social body that self-identifies as the working
class.  Thompson allegedly eliminates this distinction.  More precisely, he seems to
dismiss the category of “class-in-itself” entirely, and reduce the category of “working
class” to nothing more than “class-for-itself.”  For Thompson the working class does
not fully exist until it achieves class consciousness.  Put differently, at least during
his strongest moments, Thompson seems to completely reject the “objective”
dimension of class, in favor of its “subjective” component.
Criticisms of Thompson often attack a gross caricature of his actual
argument.   Thompson did not ignore the real, grounded, “objective” conditions
of class formation—in fact, he remained keenly aware of their continued
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importance.   Likewise, he did not present class as a mythical, free-floating
concept.   But in granting the primacy of cultural components of class formation,
Thompson apparently challenged a sacred dogma of Marxist orthodoxy.
Some critics even reduce the Anderson–Thompson debate to lingering
grudges about a struggle for the control of the New Left Review (NLR).  The NLR, cofounded by Thompson in 1960 and initially edited by cultural studies pioneer Stuart
Hall, quickly became the leading English-language voice for dissident (anti-Stalinist)
Marxists. Its early years were marked by a series of power struggles that were often
played out on its pages.   With regard to Anderson and Thompson, the facts are
quite clear—Thompson hired Anderson to head up the NLR in 1963.  Within one
year, Anderson had fired Thompson, realigned the board of directors in his favor,
and assumed directorship of the journal himself.  Thompson remained a prominent
figure in the British neo-Marxist milieu, but never reassumed control of the NLR, so
there is no shortage of bad blood between the two men. At times, the debate leans
toward comedy, as in Thompson Dickensian caricature of Anderson.6  But the real
point of tension centers on another prominent intellectual in the European Marxist
scene—one Louis Althusser.
In the 1960s, Thompson succeeded in persuading a significant number of
Marxist intellectuals to all but disown Althusser.  In an obvious reference to Althusser’s
base–superstructure dichotomy from “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,”
Thompson writes, “historical change eventuates, not because a given ‘basis’ must
give rise to a correspondent ‘superstructure,’ but because changes in productive
relationships are experienced in social and cultural life, refracted in men’s ideas and
their values, and argued through in their actions” (Thompson 1978: 22).  Today, the
Anderson–Thompson debate deserves being revisited in light of the recent return
to Althusser, led by such prominent thinkers as Derrida, Butler, and, in his own way,
Foucault.  Like Althusser, these scholars displaced the subject as the crucial agent of
history.  If the intellectual tide is now swinging back towards Altussser, might that
portend a left reading of Anderson’s defense of Althusser’s structuralism against
Thompson’s (now somewhat less trendy) Marxist humanism?   Or is Anderson’s
Althusser significantly different from the Althusser that has recently been embraced
by the academic left?  These questions deserve further analysis.
Althusser is often cast as a crude economic determinist.   Imprudent
statements like the following lend credence to that characterization: “The class
struggle does not go on in the air … it is rooted in the mode of production and
exploitation in a given class society. The emphasis reverts continually towards
the economic base. To contend that social formations typically derive their unity
from the diffusion of values, or the exercise of violence, across a plurality of
individual or group wills is to reject the Marxist insistence on the ultimate primacy
of economic determinations of history” (Althusser 1969: 34).  At first glance, this
rigidly deterministic view seems to align closely with some of Anderson’s writing:
“The problem of social order is irresoluble so long as the answer to it is sought at
the level of intention … It is, and must be, the dominant mode of production that
confers fundamental unity on a social formation, allocating their objective positions
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to classes within it, and distributing the agents within each class” (Anderson 1978:
55).  But Althusser’s intention was not to position the economy at the center of
social life, even if some of his statements, when taken out of context, give that
impression.  Rather, he will best be remembered for his questioning the primacy
of the Hegelian subject, and his contributions to the revival of anti-humanist
philosophy.   
Althusser famously posited an “epistemological break” between the naively
humanist “early Marx” (of the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844) and
the more sophisticated “late Marx” (of Capital).  In his view, the authentic Marx
emerged at or about 1852.   In his reading of Marx, the development of entire
societies could be determined, though only “in the last instance,” by the economy.  In
his famous phrase, which is often crudely taken out of context, history is a “process
without a subject.”  It is not difficult to understand why Thompson, whose theories
leaned so heavily on the autonomous human subject, would wholeheartedly reject
Althusser.  Yet even Althusser was not the rigid economic determinist that Thompson
and his humanist followers tried to depict.  In Poverty, Thompson goes to lengths to
depict Althusser as the consummate Stalinite, and Anderson as his lackey, but the
men’s records tell a quite different story.  Althusser was outspoken in his criticisms
of the USSR before it was popular to do so, and he broke with the French Communist
Party over their position on the events of May 1968, among other issues.  (True to
form, Althusser rejected the label “structuralist.”)  Furthermore, Anderson himself
was anything but an orthodox Althusserian.  Under his tenure at the NLR, a number
of articles formulating criticisms of Althusser were published, and Anderson does
the same in his own books.  Britain at the time was rife with orthodox Althusserians,
but Anderson was not one of them.   Indeed, if one desired to attack Althusser
vicariously via one of his followers, one could hardly have picked a worse target
than Anderson.
Indeed, the cultural studies baton would be passed off in the late 1970s
and early 1980s to Stuart Hall’s Centre for Cultural Studies, who attempted a
synthesis of Thompsonian cultural history along with (their own version) of
Althusserianism.   There were important methodological differences between the
Thompson and Hall camps, which exacerbated antagonisms on both sides. Rather
than pouring over historical documents, as Thompson had done in preparing MEWC
and his other major works, Hall’s followers tended to be theoretically oriented,
shunning painstaking empiricism in favor of pure theory.
There is a danger that the entire debate might be reduced to a question
of free will versus determinism (or what sociologists often call “structure vs.
agency”).   The reality is both more sophisticated, and more petty, and not only
because neither Anderson nor Thompson are adequate representatives of these
respective “positions.”  Although Thompson is clearly aligned with the “agency” pole,
his “deep historicism” is considerably more complex.  Thompson forcefully asserts
the primacy of history over theory, and makes the admittedly tautological case
that arguments about historiography can best be evaluated against the backdrop
of historical fact.  What begins as a defense of Marxist history quickly becomes a
defense of the historical enterprise in general, as he insists on the determinate
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properties of (historical) facts.  Thompson’s attack is not on theory per se, but on a
proto-postmodern relativism.  Thompson argues against both crude empiricism (he
would unquestionably take issue with the “socio-economic status” variable that
most quantitative sociologists use as a stand-in for class) and against unprincipled
theoreticism (à la Althusser).  Instead, he pushes for a cautious, historically-grounded
empiricism.  
Thompson’s position on determinacy is complex to say the least.   While
in one passage he writes, “People were so hungry that they were willing to risk
their lives upsetting a barrow of potatoes.  In these conditions, it might appear more
surprising if men had not plotted revolutionary uprisings than if they had” (Thompson
1964: 592), he seems to contradict himself elsewhere, as when he critiques the
“abbreviated and ‘economistic’ picture of the food riot as a direct, spasmodic,
irrational response to hunger” (Thompson 1964: 528).  So as much as Thompson
argues against the notion that rebellion is an instinctual preconscious response
to hunger, he strives to maintain the causal connection between deprivation and
revolt.  
So Anderson the neo-positivist uses Althusser in his economic determinist
mode as a weapon against Thompson.  But in a certain sense it is Althusser the antihumanist who delivers a more searing critique of Thompson—a side of Althusser
that Anderson clearly chooses to ignore, for it slices both ways.  Surely Anderson
understands that, were he to invoke Althusser the anti-humanist, his own project
would likewise be dead in the water.
Thompson and Sociology
MEWC could not be more different from the dominant strains of
comparative-historical sociology.    Thompson was attacked anew in the 1980s
and 1990s by a new generation of scholars, most of them too young to have
witnessed his debates with Anderson firsthand.  Yet their critiques were very much
in the tradition of Anderson—they were methodological in nature.  Craig Calhoun
argued that Thompson “does not much examine structural positions of workers
within the economy as a whole” (Calhoun 1982: 21; my emphasis). The eminent
British sociologist Anthony Giddens similarly criticized MEWC for “[collapsing] the
spectrum of conditions which actually led to the formation of the English working
class ... into an opposition between protest and resistance largely internal to the
ideas and behavior of the members of the working class themselves” (Giddens 1987:
212; my emphasis).  Robert Murphy accuses Thompson of defining class as “an act
of will rather than by objective situation” (Murphy 1986: 256) and insinuates that
Thompson’s working class “disappears” when it loses consciousness.   (This is of
course a gross exaggeration and an incredible oversimplifcation of Thompson’s quite
nuanced argument.)  By now, these critiques should be familiar.  Calhoun, Giddens
and Murphy argue for the primacy of “structural positions,” “conditions,” and the
“objective situation.”   They are simply rehearsing the arguments Anderson made
twenty years earlier, with only the slightest variation.
But historians like Thompson are under no obligation to generalize, and
Thompson makes no claim to comprehensiveness.  A detailed examination of the
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economic conditions of early industrial Britain might be a useful project—but it is
not Thompson’s.  To turn the tables, mainstream historical sociology might stand to
benefit from the careful, “micro-level” analysis that Thompson does so well.  One
gets the sense that Calhoun, Giddens, Murphy and Thompson’s other critics
are superimposing their own set of sociological standards over of a completely
disanalagous study.  If Thompson is to be judged by any standards, it is only fair that
they be the standards required by his intellectual project.
Similar problems emerge when authors attempt to merge Thompson
with other comparative–historical   luminaries.   For example, Alvin So and
Muhammad Hikam (1989) try to synthesize Thompson and Wallerstein to
produce a third, composite method. Although exiled to the semi-periphery at
SUNY Binghamton, Wallerstein’s influence on comparative–historical sociology
is immeasurable.   So and Hakim devote twenty pages to exploring connections
and possible alliances between the two men.  They depict the two as intellectual
siblings, and even propose an analytical technique they call “class struggle analysis,”
designed to fuse the two authors at the hip.   Yet So and Hikam’s reasoning seems
a bit forced—Wallerstein’s world-system analysis represents grand theory if there
ever was one.  Thompson’s obsession with working-class poetry could not be further
removed from Wallerstein’s efforts to design an all-encompassing model of global
capitalism.
Eventually, So and Hakim’s true intentions are laid bare—to subordinate
Thompson to a Wallersteinian approach, even as they purport to remain faithful to
both.  So and Hikam (1989) accuse Thompson of “a-structural analysis; subjectivism;
and unclear class boundaries.”  Drawing on Craig Calhoun’s The Question of Class
Struggle—a book-length diatribe against Thompson—the authors argue:
The spectrum of conditions which actually led to the formation of the
English working class are collapsed into an opposition between protest
and resistance largely internal to the ideas and behavior of the members
of the working class themselves. (1989: 461)
So and Hikam further criticize Thompson, arguing that “struggle to form (or
before forming) a class should not be conceptualized as class struggle because the
goal of class formation may not materialize” (1989: 455). So struggle by a putative
“class” prior to the “moment” of class formation (as defined by Thompson) is not
actually class struggle since it is uncertain at that point whether or not a class will
emerge.   Despite their best intentions, this modification probably creates more
problems than it resolves.  For one thing, Thompson never suggests that there is
a “single, definable moment” of class formation.  Rather, as he asserts numerous
times, class formation is a process.  Some classes might form more successfully than
others, but nowhere does he suggest it is possible to isolate the turning point at which
a pre-class formation becomes an actual class.  Second, So and Hakim’s definition
of class struggle only emerges after the fact, once it is finally clear that a class has,
in fact, been formed.  This seems to grant the historian special power to distinguish
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class struggle from not-yet-class-struggle.   Finally, their definition assumes that
unsuccessful or partially successful struggle is not actually class struggle.
But there is another problem here.   Despite MEWC’s title, Thompson
acknowledges that British workers rarely self-identified as a “working class.”  Instead,
they used the much broader descriptor “productive class.”   This term refers not
only to the proletariat, but to an ad hoc class alliance that included petty-bourgeois
elements and remnants of the pre-industrial era, including store owners, smalltime manufacturers and self-employed artisans.   Indeed, the “productive class”
comprised the vast majority of British society, excluding only large manufacturers,
major landowners, nobility, and royalty.   That British people failed to draw class
boundaries more narrowly is a problem, in Aronowitz’s view.  The point is not that
the working class should forgo cross-class alliances (even Marx predicted that the
petty-bourgeois would eventually view their interests as more closely aligned with
the proletariat than with the capitalists), but that the workers must self-identify as
a class before they can build coalitions.  Proletarians have a fundamentally different
relationship to capitalist production than do small-business owners or craftsmen,
and understanding this relationship is a prerequisite for successful class formation.  
But to what extent does the idea of a “productive class” bleed into Thompson’s
own definition of the working class?  For Craig Calhoun, Thompson’s loose definition
of class leads him to include some workers who ought to be considered petty
bourgeois.  Aronowitz is quite forgiving, but Calhoun is far more pointed: “so much of
what Thompson calls ‘the making of the working class’ is the reactionary radicalism
of the artisinate”  (1982: 103). There is some truth to this critique, but in my view it
stems from a fundamental misunderstanding of Thompson’s intellectual project.
Thompson’s work begs the question: What might it mean to treat class not
as a unit of analysis, or as an operationalizable category, but as a conceptual frame to
be employed for the purpose of explaining and interpreting social relations?  This
project may be beyond the bounds of mainstream sociology, but it is a worthwhile
one.  Even when presented the opportunity to more precisely define and delimit his
concept of class, Thompson refuses.
Theda Skocpol’s mapping of the field offers some insight here.   In the
concluding chapter of her edited collection, Skocpol (1984) sketches out three major
methodological strategies for comparative–historical sociology. These consist of (1)
a deductive approach, (2) an interpretive approach, and (3) an analytical approach.
To grossly oversimplify her complex argument, deductive scholars map individual
case studies on general models, interpretive scholars explain case studies without
reliance on model-making, while analytical scholars combine these two strategies.
(Skocpol clearly favors strategy 3, and locates herself within this tradition.) According
to Skocpol, Anderson favors strategy 1, while Thompson confines himself strictly to
strategy 2.  Thompson’s critics (Calhoun, So and Hikam, et al.) work within strategies
1 and 3, and seek to criticize Thompson on these bases, without recognizing that his
work lies within strategy 2.  Their critique, which is based on their standards, not
Thompson’s own, therefore falls flat.
Thompson ultimately has a complex and tenuous relationship to mainstream
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sociology.  Thompson’s assertion that classes are “made” has reached the point of
a certain orthodoxy among class theorists and sociologists.   His short preface is
probably among the most quoted texts in the field, and for a sociologist to write
about class without mentioning Thompson would approach heresy.  In terms of the
respective impacts on sociology, Thompson clearly takes the prize, with Anderson
reduced to a mere footnote, if he deserves mention at all.  In a catch-all textbook the
eminent British sociologist Anthony Giddens has written:
E. P. Thompson could be described as the sociologists’ historian.  There
are few historians whom sociologists are more fond of quoting   ... The
affinity which sociologists feel for Thompson’s work can be explained ... by
reference to Thompson’s concern with problems of class formation and
class consciousness.  (Giddens 1987: 203)
But Giddens pointedly neglects to mention that the feeling was not mutual.  Indeed,
Thompson seemed to harbor a deep-seated resentment toward sociology.   His
introduction ranks among the more powerful and angry critiques of sociology
written to date.   After rereading MEWC, one begins to wonder how many of
Thompson’s admirers have any sort of familiarity with the text at all.   While
sociologists constantly cite MEWC’s fifteen-page introduction, in which he lays out
the theoretical underpinnings of his argument, few deign to wade into the body of
the text, and fewer still emulate Thompson’s method. Of course, it doesn’t help that
Thompson’s introduction includes a series of spirited jabs at sociology, like this one:
“the finest-meshed sociological net cannot give us a pure specimen of class, any
more than it can give us one of deference or of love” (Thompson 1963: 9).
Statements like these leave Thompson vulnerable to the claim that he fails
to define class boundaries.  Taking his metaphor a bit too literally, Murphy counters,
“it would be helpful to know whether Thompson is using a finely-meshed net which
catches almost everyone in the ‘working people,’ or a wide-meshed net which
catches virtually no one, or what in fact his ‘working people’ net does catch” (Murphy
1986: 255). Of course, this quip completely misses the point: Thompson deliberately
refuses to define class in a neat, bounded, and “measurable” way.  This is not an
omission on his part, but rather is characteristic of his overall method.   It seems
Thompson has expanded the concept of class struggle by including in it not just
the struggle after forming a class, but also the struggle to form a class (or even the
struggle before forming a class).  So class moves from an analytical category to a
heuristic device—a move that foreshadows the anti-positivist critique of the human
sciences.
Within sociology, positivism has been and remains the dominant strain.  The
explosion of cultural studies, science studies, and post–second-wave feminism in
the 1980s and early 1990s briefly seemed to challenge the positivist orthodoxy,
only to be reabsorbed by the 2000s.   Today, even the American Sociological
Association’s unorthodox theory section is controlled by methodological positivists.
Although methodological positivism is usually associated with quantitatively-
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oriented sociologists, George Steinmetz (among others) has argued that qualitative
sociologists commit the same crimes with blunter weapons. Few sociologists
openly stake a claim to the legacy of Auguste Comte, but his specter still haunts the
discipline’s hallowed halls.  Even the most qualitatively-oriented sociologists adhere
to methodological positivism to an extent that is unmatched in the humanities.
For Steinmetz, positivist social science has a number of key features, but the
necessary condition for epistemological positvism, or its “common denominator …
is the orientation to regularity determinism or covering laws” (2005: 285). That is,
positivists assume for every event y there is an event x or set of events x1...xn which
can be neatly predicted based on y.  To be sure, not all positivsts adhere rigidly to this
formulation, but according to Steinmetz, this logic constitutes an “epistemological
unconscious,” which structures and delimits the possibilities for sociological thought
even when it is not explicitly invoked.   Secondarily, positivists adopt a hardline
scientific naturalism, or the assumption that “the social world can be studies in the
same general manner as a the natural world” (2005: 283). In the process, social
scientists borrow many of the tools of natural science, with its requisite emphasis
on prediction and willful ignorance of concept, time and space dependence.  Critics
of positivism claim that social scientists should reject the presuppositions of the
natural sciences and create new methodologies appropriate to their unique objects
of study.
On the other hand, history, as a discipline, has long tread the fuzzy boundary
between the humanities and the social sciences.  Not quite systematic enough to be
a social science, but too obsessed with “truth” and “facts” to join the humanities,
history occupies a wasteland within the academy.  Thompson, for his part, clearly
seeks to move history away from its social scientific counterparts but does so from
within the framework of Marxist history, where a somewhat different but no less
doctrinaire positivism reigns supreme.
During the 1970s and 1980s, Marxism was eclipsed by Erik Olin Wright
and the self-described “analytical” Marxists, whose intellectual project centered
on recuperating Marxist categories for quantitative sociology.  Countless gallons of
ink were spilled on such critical tasks as “proving” Marx’s labor theory of value,
as though the successful completion of this task would vindicate Marxism once
and for all.   But Wright’s approach, which Aronowitz (2003) dismisses as “social
cartography,” explicitly ignores the cultural dimensions of class formation. Likewise,
Wright has no interest in history; rather than explain when and how classes form, his
analysis is consumed with accounting for class relations at a given moment.
In a similar vein, empirically-oriented sociologists typically operationalize
class using the variable “socio-economic status” (SES)—itself an aggregate
of income, net assets, occupational prestige, and education level.   Following
Thompson, a number of critical sociologists have argued that while SES might be
an adequate measure of (Weberian) status, it does not accurately measure class,
since it completely ignores ideology, consciousness, and history—the “subjective”
components of social class.   Of course, “class consciousness” never appears on
the General Social Survey and would be difficult to input into SPSS.  “Measuring”
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consciousness can only be achieved through the kind of deep historical narrative
that Thompson attempts in MEWC—completely foreign to most sociologists, even
those of a qualitative orientation.
For these reasons, as impressive as MEWC is, it might not meet the
standards of academic rigor that pervade contemporary sociology.  As a discipline,
sociology has a structuralist bias.   Even “cultural sociologists” have drawn the ire
of “cultural studies” scholars (often located in the humanities) for overemphasizing
the structural dimension of social life.   One even wonders if MEWC would even
meet the minimum expectations of a typical dissertation committee.  If there is a
single defining characteristic of sociology, it is the impulse to build models, create
categories and generalize across multiple cases.   Only the postmodernists at the
fringe of the discipline have completely rejected generalization as a worthwhile
strategy.   The sociologist who rejects the discipline’s holy triumvirate—modeling,
generalization, and comparison—is by most accounts not a sociologist at all.
The other problem with Thompson’s method from the perspective of
mainstream social science is his understanding of time.   While statisticians can
compare fixed points along a timeline (using a time-series analysis or a cohort
study), they cannot easily measure the dynamic nature of historical processes.  But,
of course, historical processes (like class formation) are constantly in transition.  As
the Heisenberg principle famously states, one cannot study sub-atomic particles
themselves but only their effects.  Modern sociology lacks the ability to deal with
time-in-motion.  Time-series and cohort-based analysis are still atemporal insofar as
they are premised on observing social phenomena at a fixed moment in time.  On
the other hand, there is a sense of temporality in Thompson’s writing that few
sociologists even approximate.   Early in his career, Thompson penned an oftenoverlooked essay entitled “Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism” (1967)
in which he explains the rise of the clock, and the modern concept of time itself,
in the context of the capitalist revolution and working-class resistance.  Thompson
argues that bosses eliminated the pre-modern notion of time—which was basically
task-oriented—and replaced it with regimented factory time—with an emphasis on
subdivision and precision—for the purpose of extracting maximum labor from the
new proletariat.  The idea of time itself was radically transformed.  In one of his more
convincing moments, Thompson argues that class cannot be measured ahistorically:
“If we stop history at a given point, then there are no classes but simply a multitude
of individuals with a multitude of experiences but if we watch these men over an
adequate period of social change, we observe patterns in their relationships, their
ideas, and their institutions. Class is defined by men as they live” (Thompson 1964:
11). This rigid insistence on the dynamic nature of class is appealing rhetorically, but
it presents an insurmountable challenge to the cottage industry that has organized
around the notion that class exists as a static category, outside of time.
One final question remains: what use do sociologists have for history?   If
Thompson’s MEWC is only tolerable when eviscerated and subsumed under the
rubric of a demonstrably sociological frame, what is it actually worth on its own
terms?   The most prominent comparative–historical sociologists—Moore, Skocpol,
Tilly, Wallerstein—wield grand theory like a sledgehammer.   Similarly, Anderson’s

26

Formations Vol.1 No.1 2010

essays, along with his masterworks Lineages and Passages are predicated
upon the assumption that a particular model—one in which the working class
achieves “full” development—is preferable. In contrast, Thompson offers nothing in
the way of grand theory but instead offers a theory of pure historical contingency that
is anathema to most historically-oriented sociologists.   But it should be no surprise
that, in the process of fusing two disciplines with asymmetrical properties, one will
be forced to bend.  As Sewell (1996) has keenly observed, making sociology historical
cannot simply be a question of increasing the number of data points.  It may even be
the case that, against the wishes of mainstream comparative–historical sociologists,
history and sociology are not entirely compatible. Taking history seriously will require
abandoning old assumptions, adopting new methodological orientations, and in the
process, overturning many of the foundations of sociology itself.

_________________________________________________

   What has become known as the Anderson–Thompson debate refers to a series of books
and articles spanning five years. In chronological order, they are Thompson’s book Making
of the English Working Class (1964, hereafter MEWC); Anderson’s review article “Origins of
the Present Crisis” (1964) in the New Left Review (hereafter “Origins”); Thompson’s response
“Peculiarities of the English” (1965) in the Socialist Register, later republished with minor edits in
an essay collection entitled The Poverty of Theory 1978 (hereafter Poverty); Anderson’s rebuttal
“Socialism and Pseudo-Empiricism” (1966) in the New Left Review (hereafter “Socialism”); and
a reissue of Anderson’s previous essays with a new introduction, called Arguments Within
English Marxism (1980, hereafter Arguments). The tone of these articles becomes gradually
more antagonistic as time passes.  For the sake of simplicity, I will ignore the contributions Tom
Nairn made to the debate.
1

   This notion of class closely parallel Georg Lukács’ (1971) distinction between “class in itself”
and “class for itself,” although Thompson does not use this terminology, probably because
Lukács’ book was not available in English translation at the time.
2

    If Anderson were to update his piece today, he might note that Britain has led the pack
of Western European democracies in the movement toward Americanization, dramatically
scaling back its already diminutive welfare state.
3

   On the other hand, while Thompson’s stated objective is to rescue the British working class
from charges of immaturity, he sometimes goes too far, and finds himself making claims about
British superiority.  If Anderson is a Francophile, Thompson is an unrepentant Anglophile.  His
project is to reclaim a specifically British cultural history.  Thompson is ultimately something of
a British nationalist.  In the final analysis, the Anderson–Thompson debate is clouded by the
specter of nationalism.
4

   They disagree over the nature and timing of the bourgeois revolution. For Thompson, this
revolution dissolves into a series of events that stretches back to the twelfth century and
continues, as an ongoing process, until the nineteenth century. For Anderson, the English
5
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aristocracy remained well into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (in the sociological, not
titular sense).
    Anderson, having a less refined sense of humor, seems to prefer crass insults to literary
allusions.   At one point, he accuses Thompson of a performance “laden with self-delighted
pirouettes, and constant sacrifices of accuracy and sobriety…”  (1966: 6)
6
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